This brand of imperialism is known as ‘indirect rule’, and it constituted one of the many gaping contradictions of colonialism. In practice, this saw Britain impose its will through cooperative rulers like Sa’id, who could continue to govern their lands according to their own local traditions. In contrast to the formal empire and ‘direct’ rule Britain used to govern much of its Indian and African colonies, the Persian Gulf was administered through a mosaic of indirect influences that constituted ‘informal’ empire. This was a role Britain remained formally committed to until 1971. These chiefly concerned the rulers waiving their rights to diplomacy and external interactions to the British in exchange for their military protection. Although it had a presence in the Gulf since the 17 th century, territories like Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States weren’t formally incorporated into the empire until a flurry of treaties were signed with local rulers in the late 19 th and early 20 th centuries. To begin it is firstly important to establish the nature of Britain’s position in the region. Contextualising Sultan Qaboos’ continued authoritarian rule into the 21 st century and Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with Oman as a colonial legacy provides an essential narrative, whose discussion is necessary to properly decolonise the history of the Persian Gulf. Set against the backdrop of Britain’s last colonial war, and with Sa’id’s British installed successor, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa’id still ruling Oman to this day, Oman offers the clearest example of the impact of a successful colonial coup. Focusing on these disparate attitudes, this article will aim to show the fascinating window the issue of development provides into the changing face of empire in the 1960s and 1970s, at its heart revealing a clash between old and new imperial mindsets. According to Takriti and Uzi Rabi, the issue central to this coup, and indeed Shakhbut’s, was that Sa’id’s attitude to the development of his country was at odds with the plan that British imperial architects had for the region in anticipation of their withdrawal. Just as with Shakhbut bin Sultan Al Nahyan, ruler of Abu Dhabi who was dethroned in a British coup in 1966, Sa’id was a loyal servant of the British Empire, abhorring of the wave of militant Arab anti-colonial nationalism sweeping the region in the 1950s and 1960s and relying almost solely on British muscle for his authority. One coup in particular stands out – that launched against Sultan Sa’id bin Taimur, ruler of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman in 1970. Historian Abdel Razzaq Takriti has coined a useful term for understanding this policy of British officials orchestrating clandestine palace coups against leaders seen as resisting their imperial designs – the ‘colonial coup’. Oman and the United Arab Emirates, for example, are both among the many lingering products of British imperial interventions in the region that attempted to ensure upon Britain’s withdrawal from the region, it left behind leaders who were both friendly to the West and capable of safeguarding its oil interests. In fact, the current political order of the Gulf is deeply rooted in Britain’s retreat from empire. However, strangely absent from the media’s discussion on the situation in the Gulf are any references to the not so distant history of Britain’s imperial presence in the region, which formally ended in 1971. The dispatch of British warships to the Persian Gulf earlier this summer has, if nothing else, served as a poignant reminder of the massive investment Britain has in the oil rich region.
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